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Opportunity or threat? Public attitudes towards EU
freedom of movement
Soﬁa Vasilopoulou and Liisa Talving
Department of Politics, University of York, York, UK
ABSTRACT
This article examines the eﬀect of individual and contextual variables on
preference formation towards European Union (EU) freedom of movement.
Our multilevel analyses of Eurobarometer data show that citizens with low
levels of human capital and strong feelings of national identity are more likely
to oppose intra-EU migration. However, we argue that in order to fully grasp
variation in public preferences, we need to consider the domestic context.
Utilitarian and aﬀective theories have more explanatory power in richer
countries, but in less aﬄuent member states support for free movement is
evenly high irrespective of individual dispositions. Our ﬁndings have
implications for the progress of European integration, especially at a time
when the EU is in the process of deciding on a course of action about its
future direction.
KEYWORDS Attitudes; EU freedom of movement; identity; macro-economic conditions; utility
Introduction
Mobility is one of the key principles of European integration. It relates to the
four fundamental freedoms guaranteed by EU law: the freedom of movement
of labour, capital, goods and services. These underpin the EU’s single market,
and are seen as complementary to the EU’s political objectives. While free
movement of persons has a strong symbolic value because it relates to EU citi-
zenship rights, it also embodies a variety of challenges. There is a tension
between the EU’s objective to increase competitiveness and address unem-
ployment on the one hand, and member states’ ability to regulate their dom-
estic labour market institutions on the other. The progressive lifting of
transnational restrictions to workers from Central and Eastern Europe from
the mid-2000s onwards in combination with the ﬁnancial crisis and sub-
sequent economic diﬃculties in many EU member states resulted in high
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intra-EU migration ﬂows, which increased signiﬁcantly from poorer to richer
member states (European Commission 2014a, 2014b; Portes 2015). The
number of EU nationals working in another EU country increased from 5.8
million to 6.6 million in the period 2008–2012, which translates into a 14
per cent increase (Eurofound 2014: 17). This trend continued with the pro-
portion of EU nationals living in a member state other than the one that
they were born in rising approximately 5.3 per cent from 2014 to 2015 (Euro-
pean Commission 2017: 10).
Although intra-EU mobility is low compared to migration ﬂows from outside
the EU and in comparison to the United States (European Commission 2014b),
concerns over the impact of intra-EU migration have become a major political
issue (Portes 2015), fuelling Eurosceptic attitudes combined with anti-immi-
grant sentiment, and contributing to Brexit (Hobolt 2016; Vasilopoulou 2016).
Against this background, this article explains attitudes towards EU free move-
ment, conducting multilevel analysis of four Eurobarometer surveys, carried
out between 2015 and 2017. Our contribution is three-fold. First, we ﬁll a sub-
stantive gap in the literature by examining for the ﬁrst time Euroscepticism from
the perspective of preferences for EU freedom of movement. Second, we build
on and extend literature that examines the domestic foundations of EU prefer-
ences (De Vries 2017; Rohrschneider 2002; Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010;
Sánchez-Cuenca 2000) by pointing to the role of country-speciﬁc factors in
understanding why some individuals support freedom of movement and
others oppose it. We show that national GDP is the most prominent determi-
nant of opposition to free movement. It also moderates the impact of individ-
ual-level variables on mobility-related preferences. Utilitarian and aﬀective
theories have more explanatory power in richer countries, but in less aﬄuent
member states support for freemovement is evenly high irrespective of individ-
ual dispositions. Third, we empirically substantiate that the structure of attitudes
towards EU freedom of movement does not fully mirror the structure of general
attitudes towards European integration.
Modelling public attitudes towards EU freedom of movement
The ﬁrst step for explaining citizen preferences towards free movement is to
try to unpack the policy itself. Freedom of movement is a fundamental prin-
ciple of cooperation within the EU framework, which relates to EU citizens’
right to freely work and reside in another EU country and to enjoy equal treat-
ment with nationals in access to employment, working conditions, and all
other social and tax advantages. Free movement of persons was set out in
the Treaty of Rome and is the cornerstone of EU citizenship, which was estab-
lished by the Treaty of Maastricht. EU citizenship is an automatic right con-
ferred upon nationals of EU member states, which is practically activated
through free movement.
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Very low levels of mobility were observed until the 2000s with approxi-
mately 1 per cent of EU citizens living in a country other than their country
of birth. Intra-EU migration ﬂows increased following the EU’s enlargement
to Central and Eastern Europe, primarily in those countries that had not
placed restrictions, including the UK, Ireland and Sweden. The ﬁnancial
crisis, along with the progressive lifting of transnational restrictions to
workers from Central and Eastern Europe, further contributed to an increase
in labour mobility. Intra-EU migration primarily occurred from poorer
towards richer EU member states (European Commission 2014a, 2014b,
2017) with the number of EU migrants born in another EU country rising to
4 per cent in 2013 (European Commission 2014b: 5; for a brief history, see
Portes 2015). The education levels of the ‘new’ active EU movers’ cohort,
i.e., those who moved to another EU member state during 2008–2015 with
up to two years of residence, are primarily medium and high. The proportion
ranges from 34 to 49 per cent for highly educated movers and from 29 to 46
per cent for medium educated movers. During the same period, the percen-
tage of low educated individuals ranged from 17 to 21 per cent. This suggests
that primarily skilled individuals moved abroad, although often migrants from
Central and Eastern Europe tend to be overqualiﬁed for their jobs in their new
‘homeland’ compared to EU-15 movers and natives (European Commission
2017: 12; 65).
EU freedom of movement should not be equated with immigration from
outside the EU. The facilitation of shared experiences through the right of
free movement has been thought to foster common European values and
identity, and is a constitutive element of political identity and an EU polity-
in-the-making. This is also substantiated empirically in our pooled data
where the correlation between people’s attitudes towards EU freedom of
movement and attitudes towards immigration from outside the EU is very
low (r = .12) (see McLaren 2001). That being said, European integration,
freedom of movement, and immigration, all contribute towards a change in
demographics and the weakening of territorial boundaries (Hooghe and
Marks 2018). While developing our hypotheses, we thus draw upon research
on Euroscepticism and anti-immigration sentiment, while at the same time
showing where expectations regarding attitudes towards freedom of move-
ment diﬀer. These two strands of literature tend to put forward at least two
main contrasting hypotheses regarding the nature of opinion formation,
pitting the utilitarian perspective against the aﬀective approach (Hainmueller
and Hopkins 2014; Hobolt and De Vries 2016).
Economic self-interest
The rational model suggests that support for European integration is a func-
tion of economic utility (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Gabel and Whitten
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN PUBLIC POLICY 3
1997). Citizens in diﬀerent socio-economic situations may experience diﬀerent
costs and beneﬁts from European integration (Hooghe and Marks 2018; Kriesi
et al. 2012). The EU divides citizens between those who win from transnation-
alism and thus support the EU, and those who lose from the same process and
prefer demarcation. Whereas economic liberalisation provides more opportu-
nities to highly-skilled and highly-educated individuals, it increases insecurity
among citizens with low levels of human capital. Well-educated and highly-
skilled citizens have the cognitive, professional and behavioural skills to suc-
cessfully compete in changing environments, and are thus more likely to
embrace change and mobility (Hakhverdian et al. 2013; Inglehart 1970). Relat-
edly, political economy approaches to immigration attitudes suggest that a
native person’s occupation and education inﬂuence how they view immigra-
tion. The labour market competition hypothesis suggests that, when consid-
ering immigration policy, individuals make an assessment of its potential
impact on the wages of similarly skilled nationals (Mayda 2006; Scheve and
Slaughter 2001). If capital is internationally mobile, then immigration
inﬂows are likely to aﬀect factor prices, by lowering the wages of low-
skilled workers and by raising the wages of high-skilled workers. Examining
the United States, Scheve and Slaughter (2001) found that low-skilled citizens
are signiﬁcantly more likely to oppose immigration.1 More broadly, globalisa-
tion and economic openness tend to increase wage volatility, which results in
workers feeling economically insecure because they tend to face higher risks
of unemployment or receiving low wages (Walter 2010).
It is conceivable that a similar mechanism underpins attitudes towards EU
freedom of movement. Free movement has a strong utilitarian component
related to the potential ﬁnancial costs and beneﬁts of employing EU
workers in the domestic labour market.2 At the individual level, the way in
which citizens interpret opportunities and threats deriving from freedom of
movement may depend on their own level of skills and education. On the
one hand, those with high levels of human capital, who are more likely to
beneﬁt from international competition and ﬂexible access to low cost employ-
ment, may perceive freedom of movement as an opportunity. On the other
hand, individuals with low levels of human capital may see freedom of move-
ment as a threat to their status because it adds an extra layer of competition
with non-natives, and thus oppose the opening up of borders.3
H1: Individuals with low levels of human capital are less likely to support EU
freedom of movement.
Identity and perceived threats to in-groups
The aﬀective approach suggests that, rather than driven by self-interest, citi-
zens form their preferences with reference to sociotropic concerns regarding
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their evaluation of societal needs (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014; Hobolt
2014; McLaren 2007). The division between those who support and those
who oppose the EU is increasingly one of identity, openness and tolerance
(Hooghe and Marks 2018). Individuals who feel a strong bond with their com-
munity tend to perceive the EU as a source of threat to national integrity,
culture, and the nation-state’s control over resources. They tend to express
hostility against other groups, which they perceive as posing a threat to
their own group. Strong feelings of national identity tend to lower general
EU support (Carey 2002) and inﬂuence support for speciﬁc EU policies, includ-
ing European Economic Governance, EU enlargement, Turkish EU entry and
the deepening of integration (Hobolt 2014; Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014;
McLaren 2007). Immigration-related factors are also key antecedents of EU
attitudes with citizens who feel threatened by immigrant groups being
more sceptical towards integration (Lubbers and Scheepers 2007). Similarly,
the literature on anti-immigration attitudes demonstrates that immigration
attitudes are a question of diﬀerences among citizens in terms of cultural
values, ethnocentrism and group-speciﬁc stereotypes (Hainmueller and
Hiscox 2007; Sniderman et al. 2000).
This framework may also apply to EU freedom of movement. EU citizenship
is of an inherently cosmopolitan nature. EU citizens can simultaneously be citi-
zens of the country they were born in and citizens of the European commu-
nity. If people have limited information on how speciﬁcally EU mobility will
aﬀect their personal well-being, they may rely on sociotropic concerns
related to the potential threat that EU migrants may pose to the in-group
in order to form their judgement on freedom of movement. It is plausible
that those who identify exclusively with their national community will view
the entry of EU migrants as changing the social fabric of their country and
thus oppose freedom of movement; whereas individuals who feel strong
attachment to Europe may see EU mobility as a policy promoting the Euro-
pean project.
H2: Individuals who strongly attach to the nation-state are less likely to support
EU freedom of movement.
The domestic context
As stated in the literatures on EU integration and migration, the above model
suggests that attitudes towards EU freedom of movement depend on individ-
uals’ utilitarian calculations and aﬀective considerations. This model, however,
does not help us explain country-level variation. The level of opposition to free
movement varies considerably across EU member states. We postulate that
citizens employ the context of domestic politics in order to evaluate the
costs and beneﬁts of EU freedom of movement. We build on existing research
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that views national conditions serving as ‘benchmarks’ against which Eur-
opeans judge and evaluate integration (De Vries 2017; Rohrschneider 2002;
Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010; Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). Speciﬁcally, we
posit that citizen attitudes towards intra-EU mobility are likely to be
aﬀected by a country’s macro-economic performance.
The standard expectation is that -given that economic prosperity is one of
the core motivations behind integration- as a member state’s aﬄuence
increases, citizens tend to be more favourable of the EU (Eichenberg and
Dalton 1993; see Gabel and Whitten 1997 for mixed results). However, our
intuition regarding the eﬀect on support for freedom of movement is the
reverse. Intra-EU mobility has been primarily observed from poorer towards
richer countries (European Commission 2014a, 2014b, 2017; Portes 2015). In
2009–2014, the largest increase of intra-EU migration inﬂows occurred in
Germany (+219%), Austria (+86%), the UK (+57%), Denmark (+54%) and
Finland (+60%) (European Commission 2017: 11). Outﬂows increased primar-
ily from Eastern and Southern Europe, with countries aﬀected by the debt
crisis experiencing a reduction in net migration (European Commission
2014b). By contrast, emigration from more aﬄuent EU member states was
much lower during the same period. The key drivers of intra-EU migration
were economic, related to labour market factors, with EU migrants moving
abroad to seek better job opportunities rather than being attracted by the
host country’s welfare generosity (Giuletti 2014; Kahanec et al. 2014; Portes
2015).
These domestic conditions are likely to inﬂuence the salience and politici-
sation of issues in a given country (Rohrschneider and Loveless 2010). The
context of macro-economic performance as a pull-factor of intra-EU migration
may direct individuals in more aﬄuent member states to pay more attention
to the potential consequences of EU freedom of movement. In rich member
states, increased intra-EU mobility may stimulate discussions regarding its
potential eﬀects on domestic employment and access to labour markets. It
may also raise concerns over redistributive politics, provision of public ser-
vices, access to welfare, and competition for the collective goods of the
state with EU citizens -who are nonetheless non-nationals.4 This is substan-
tiated by economic models of migration, which suggest that wealthier
countries tend to prefer free trade over free migration (Schiﬀ 2002; Wellisch
and Walz 1998: 1597). In other words, living in wealthier EU member states,
which tend to attract more migrants, intensiﬁes the salience of the question
of immigration, and in turn increases the likelihood of popular backlash. In
contrast, not only is this question likely to be of much less importance in
poorer member states (Garry and Tilley 2009), but also there are lower oppor-
tunity costs of transferring sovereignty to the EU in this policy (Sánchez-
Cuenca 2000).
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H3: Citizens in richer EU member states are less likely to support EU freedom of
movement.
National prosperity may also moderate the link between individual-level
considerations and support for freedom of movement. Whereas individuals
who live in poorer member states tend to form their EU preferences primar-
ily on the basis of economic performance, those who reside in richer states
tend to rely on other criteria, e.g., political (Rohrschneider 2002; Rohrschnei-
der and Loveless 2010). First, related to human capital, free movement may
beneﬁt not only the winners of denationalisation, i.e., those with high levels
of human capital, but also low-skilled and low-educated citizens traditionally
placed on the losing side, especially in countries that do not fare well econ-
omically. Although emigration from poorer EU member states may cause
concerns about brain drain (see Schiff 2002 on social capital), low-skilled
and low-educated individuals in poorer member states may view freedom
of movement as an opportunity to go abroad to a richer EU member
state in order to pursue a more prosperous future. Moving to and
working in another member state for such individuals may be associated
with the prospect of upward economic mobility and may be seen as an
opportunity to break out of their position at the bottom of the labour
market. However, similar individuals living in richer member states are not
faced with analogous prospects. Since they already live in the most afﬂuent
EU countries, freedom of movement does not provide them with similar
opportunities.
H4: Individuals with low levels of human capital living in poorer EU member
states are more likely to support EU freedom of movement compared to the
same individuals living in richer EU member states.
Second, the domestic context also moderates the extent to which identity
inﬂuences preferences on freedom of movement. For example, contextual
factors inﬂuence the effect of perceived threat to in-group resources and
way of life on support for Turkish EU membership (McLaren 2007) and the
effect of European identity on support for European economic governance
(Kuhn and Stoeckel 2014). The effect of identity on support for the EU may
be conditional on economic context. In countries that are net beneﬁciaries
of the EU budget, ‘incoming funds from the EU act as a “buffer” offsetting
or diluting the possible impact of exclusive national identity on attitudes to
integration’ (Garry and Tilley 2009: 364). We similarly posit that the potential
beneﬁts from freedom of movement will weaken the effect of identity on
support for this policy in poorer member states.
H5: Individuals who strongly attach to the nation-state in poorer EU member
states are more likely to support EU freedom of movement compared to the
same individuals living in richer EU member states.
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Data and methods
To assess the attitudes of EU citizens towards EU freedom of movement, we
rely on individual-level data from the Eurobarometer survey waves 84.3
(November 2015), 85.2 (May 2016), 86.2 (November 2016) and 87.3 (May
2017),5 which ask:
What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for
each statement, whether you are for it or against it. ‘The free movement of EU
citizens who can live, work, study and do business anywhere in the EU’.
These are the only Eurobarometer surveys that have explicitly asked respon-
dents to indicate their attitude towards intra-EU mobility. Our dependent vari-
able is measured as 1 if respondents support EU freedom of movement and 0
if they are against it. Data from four survey waves were pooled into a com-
bined, hierarchically structured dataset. ‘Don’t knows’ have been omitted
from the analysis.
To test the robustness of our results, we repeat the analyses using an
alternative dependent variable, measuring general support for the EU. For
this, we utilise a survey item which asks respondents whether the EU conjures
up for them a positive, neutral or negative image.6 The variable was recoded
in a similar manner to our original dependent variable, with 1 referring to sup-
portive attitudes and 0 to all other categories (for similar coding, see Kuhn and
Stoeckel 2014). ‘Don’t knows’ are not included. The correlation between the
two dependent variables is weak (r = .15), suggesting that attitudes towards
EU freedom of movement diﬀer from opinion towards the EU in general.
To determine individuals’ level of human capital (H1), we rely on occu-
pational skills and education (Hobolt 2014). Pre-coded occupational cat-
egories in the Eurobarometer surveys include managers, other white collars,
self-employed, manual workers, house persons, unemployed (reference cat-
egory), retired, and students.7 Level of education was measured with refer-
ence to age when respondents stopped full-time education. The answers
were recoded into categories ‘up to 15 years’ referring to low education, ‘16
to 19 years’ referring to medium education and ‘20 years or older’ referring
to high education. Respondents still studying were assigned to these cat-
egories according to their actual age. To measure the strength of identity
(H2), we utilise the following question: ‘Do you see yourself as nationality
only, nationality and European, European and nationality or European
only?’. We have reversed the scale, with higher values indicating stronger
feeling of national identity. To test whether citizens in richer member states
are less supportive of EU freedom of movement (H3), we employ countries’
macro-economic performance measured as national GDP in euros per
capita for a quarter previous to survey ﬁeldwork. The data are obtained
from Eurostat. For GDP, log-transformation is used in order to improve the
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normality of the distribution. We also include interaction terms between
national GDP and individual-level measures of human capital (occupational
skills, education) (H4) and cultural dispositions (identity) (H5).
The models are estimated with a standard set of socio-demographic con-
trols that have been shown to inﬂuence EU support, e.g., age (in full years)
and gender (1 =male, 2 = female). They also include respondents’ self-place-
ment on the left-right scale (1–10), as right-wing and conservative individuals
are more likely to oppose outsiders (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), and a
squared term of left-right ideology to account for the possibility that attitudes
towards freedom of movement are more pessimistic among voters placed at
the extremes of the political spectrum. We also control for domestic proxies,
such as levels of trust in the national government (Armingeon and Ceka 2014).
Additionally, we include a variable measuring feelings towards immigration
from outside the EU (1 = very negative, 2 = fairly negative, 3 = fairly positive
and 4 = very positive). This helps us account for the possibility that opinions
on EU freedom of movement are coloured by citizens’ overall views on immi-
gration and inﬂuenced by the refugee crisis. Finally, we include a dummy for
Eurozone membership (Appendix 1 for descriptive statistics).
To account for the hierarchical structure of the data, i.e., the possibility that
responses are correlated within national surveys and standard errors are
biased, we employ multilevel regression analysis where respondents (n =
106,178) are nested in country-waves (n = 112). We also use this modelling
technique due to our substantive interest in the eﬀects of group-level predic-
tors on individual-level outcomes, which requires modelling variation on both
levels (Snijders and Bosker 1999). We run binary response random intercept
models, which include both individual- and aggregate-level variables. The
intraclass correlation of 0.13 at the aggregate-level in a null model (not
shown) indicates a weak but still existing correlation of respondents within
countries and survey waves, supporting our choice of using a multilevel esti-
mation approach.
Results
A ﬁrst look at the descriptive statistics reveals high support towards EU
freedom of movement. On average, 82.4 per cent of all respondents are in
favour and 13.1 per cent against free movement of citizens, with only 4.5
per cent not expressing a clear viewpoint. Support levels have largely
remained the same from one survey to another, ranging between 80 and
83 per cent. However, there is a great degree of variation across countries,
with opposition to free movement being stronger in Western Europe.
Countries with the highest opposition score include the UK (27.3 per cent),
Austria (27 per cent) and Denmark (24.6 per cent). These results contrast
with Southern European countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain (14,
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9.4 and 5.8 per cent respectively). The Baltic states show the lowest levels of
negative attitudes. Attitudes towards EU freedom of movement clearly diﬀer
from EU opinions more generally. Support for the EU is much lower among
Europeans compared to their approval of free movement. On average, only
27.6 per cent of respondents have a positive image of the EU, as opposed
to the 82.4 per cent who hold optimistic views towards mobility rights. Pat-
terns of country variation diverge between the two dependent variables as
well, with levels of general EU support being highest in Ireland and Bulgaria
and lowest in Greece (Figure 1). These tendencies indicate that the two
items do not merely capture diﬀerent facets of the same reality; rather they
are separate phenomena.
Next, we estimate a multilevel logistic model to identify the eﬀect of a set
of selected explanatory variables on attitudes towards freedom to work, study
and travel freely across the EU. Table 1 shows the results of a model with all
theoretically derived predictors and control variables. The variance in random
intercept, not reported here, is diﬀerent from zero, implying that support for
freedom of movement diﬀers signiﬁcantly across country-waves. A likelihood-
ratio test conﬁrms that the random-intercept model oﬀers signiﬁcant
improvement over a logistic regression model (p = .0000).
Results in the form of log odds are reported in Table 1 below. At the indi-
vidual level, we are ﬁrstly interested in the eﬀects of levels of human capital
(H1), measured as occupational skill and level of education. There are signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerences between people’s views on mobility rights depending on
their socioeconomic position. For example, compared to unemployed citizens,
Figure 1. Support for the EU and for EU freedom of movement by country. Source: Euro-
barometer 84.3 (November 2015), 85.2 (May 2016), 86.2 (November 2016) and 87.3 (May
2017). Results for general EU support without Eurobarometer 84.3.
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almost all other occupational groups have a higher probability of endorsing
freedom of movement. Likewise, education appears signiﬁcant, suggesting
that higher-educated individuals are more likely to support intra-EU mobility
Table 1. Additive models of support for the EU and for EU freedom of movement.
Model 1:
Support for EU freedom of
movement
Model 2:
Support for the
EU
Constant 7.48***
(0.85)
0.21
(0.63)
Individual-level
variables
Self-employed 0.24***
(0.06)
0.27***
(0.05)
Managers 0.26***
(0.06)
0.44***
(0.05)
Other white collars 0.07
(0.05)
0.26***
(0.05)
Manual workers 0.11**
(0.05)
0.16***
(0.04)
House persons 0.16**
(0.07)
0.14**
(0.06)
Retired 0.17***
(0.05)
0.24***
(0.05)
Students 0.65***
(0.08)
0.51***
(0.06)
Education 16–19 y −0.02
(0.03)
0.06*
(0.03)
Education >20 y 0.19***
(0.04)
0.26***
(0.03)
Feels European and national 0.12
(0.12)
0.30***
(0.09)
Feels national and European 0.19*
(0.11)
0.14*
(0.08)
Feels national only −0.63***
(0.11)
−0.76***
(0.08)
Age 0.00
(0.00)
−0.00*
(0.00)
Gender 0.02
(0.02)
−0.13***
(0.02)
Left-right ideology 0.04**
(0.02)
0.00
(0.02)
Left-right ideology2 −0.01***
(0.00)
0.00*
(0.00)
Trust in national government 0.42***
(0.03)
0.84***
(0.02)
Feelings towards non-EU
immigrants
0.41***
(0.01)
0.45***
(0.01)
Aggregate-level
variables
GDP per capita logged −0.86***
(0.10)
−0.33***
(0.07)
Eurozone member 0.81***
(0.13)
−0.01
(0.10)
Observations 74,644 57,377
Number of groups 108 81
Log Likelihood −26,278 −33,353
Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (November 2015), 85.2 (May 2016), 86.2 (November 2016) and 87.3 (May
2017). Model 2 estimated without Eurobarometer 84.3.
Notes: Multilevel logistic regression model. Entries are regression coeﬃcients with standard errors in par-
entheses. Reference categories: unemployed; education < 15 y; feels European only.
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10.
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compared to those with low levels of education. These results lend support to
our ﬁrst hypothesis by showing that utilitarian considerations inﬂuence the
attitudes towards free movement. At the same time, diﬀerences between
socioeconomic groups are not large in substantive terms. Holding all other
variables at their means, the predicted probability of being in favour of
freedom of movement is 93 per cent for students, the group most supportive
of the policy, and at 88 per cent only slightly lower for the unemployed. In a
similar manner, the likelihood of being in favour of free movement is 89 per
cent for people with low or medium levels of education and 90 per cent for
higher-educated individuals. Thus, although higher levels of human capital
increase optimism towards EU freedom of movement, support levels are
also high among citizens with lower social standing.
Table 1 also corroborates our expectation that citizens with stronger
national identity are signiﬁcantly less supportive of intra-EU mobility (H2).
The substantive diﬀerences, however, are not large for this variable either.
For example, the predicted probability of being in favour of the policy is 91
per cent for those who exclusively identify as European, but at 84 per cent
also quite high for individuals with strong attachment to their own nation.
As individual-level factors do not seem to have a major substantive impact,
we next examine contextual eﬀects. We are interested in diﬀerences in atti-
tudes towards EU freedom of movement depending on the distribution of
wealth across EU member states (H3). The eﬀect of national GDP per capita
appears signiﬁcant in the model with a negative sign, indicating that – as
hypothesised – citizens in wealthier countries are more opposed to free
movement than their counterparts in poorer member states (see Model 1 in
Table 1). The diﬀerences are statistically signiﬁcant and are also substantial
in terms of predicted probabilities. For example, the likelihood of approval
of free movement is 96 per cent for the country with the lowest GDP per
capita in the sample (Bulgaria in May 2017), 88 per cent for the median
country (Spain in November 2015), and only 71 per cent for the wealthiest
one (Luxembourg in May 2017).
Results are diﬀerent when modelling support for the EU more generally. In
contrast to attitudes towards free movement, general EU support is strongly
determined by individual-level factors such as identity (Model 2 in Table 1).
The predicted probability of having a positive image of the EU is highest
for citizens with strong European identity (49 per cent) but notably lower
for people who identify as nationals only (25 per cent). Country macroeco-
nomic eﬀects are signiﬁcant as well but remain smaller in substantive terms
compared to those on support for freedom of movement (49 per cent for
the poorest and 30 per cent for the wealthiest nation).
The ﬁndings thus far imply that citizens living in countries that are most
likely to directly beneﬁt from the possibilities to move freely in the EU tend
to express higher support for the policy. The individual-level diﬀerences
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between population groups are signiﬁcant, but not very large, which may be
due to eﬀects not being uniform across EU member states. We hypothesised
that in poor member states support for free movement is high among citizens
with low levels of human capital and with strong attachment to the nation-
state compared to the same individuals living in richer EU member states
(H4–H5). To test this indirect eﬀect of the national economy, we introduce
in separate models interaction terms between GDP per capita and three indi-
vidual-level explanatory variables, i.e., occupation, educational level and
national identity.
The results, shown in Figure 2 below and inModels 1, 2 and 3 in Appendix 2,
reveal that citizens’ personal motivations inﬂuence views on mobility rights
diﬀerently depending on the aﬄuence of a country that they live in. In
nations with low and median levels of wealth, attitudes towards movement
rights are not associated with utilitarian or aﬀective considerations. Average
marginal eﬀects largely fall on the zero-line, indicating that the eﬀects of
the three individual-level determinants are not statistically signiﬁcant
(Figure 2). In richer countries, in turn, opinions are clearly linked with individ-
ual-level factors: support for free movement varies across population groups,
being highest among students, high-educated citizens and those with strong
European identity. The substantive importance of the results is emphasised by
predicted probabilities. In the wealthiest country, the probability to favour
free movement ranges from 58 to 91 per cent depending on respondents’
sense of attachment with Europe. In the country with the lowest GDP per
capita, however, the chances of approving freedom of movement remain
between 90 and 97 per cent, irrespective of personal aﬀective considerations.
In other words, approval of freedom of movement varies considerably in rich
countries but is not inﬂuenced by identity concerns in less aﬄuent countries.
The ﬁndings are not as sharp for socioeconomic status but point in the same
direction: in poor member states, support for EU freedom of movement is
homogenously high, even among groups that are typically considered the
most Eurosceptic, such as blue-collar workers and unemployed. These
results are not evident for general EU support where patterns of individual-
level eﬀects appear much more similar across countries (Appendix 3).
In sum, our ﬁndings demonstrate that discrepancies exist for similar popu-
lation segments between member states in the extent to which they support
EU freedom of movement. The attitudes vary signiﬁcantly in poor and wealthy
nations among people with similar backgrounds, demonstrating that human
capital and identity fail to explain preferences for freedom of movement in
countries that do not fare well economically but diversify public opinion in
richer countries. This suggests that if we ignore contextual conditionality,
we miss important empirical insights into how support for or opposition to
freedom of movement is structured.
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Figure 2. Individual-level eﬀects on support for EU freedom of movement by GDP cat-
egories. Source: Eurobarometer 84.3 (November 2015), 85.2 (May 2016), 86.2 (November
2016) and 87.3 (May 2017).
Notes: Average marginal eﬀects with 95% conﬁdence intervals. Reference categories: unemployed; edu-
cation < 15 y; feels European only.
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Discussion
This article has examined European citizens’ attitudes towards free movement
of persons across the EU, focusing on the utilitarian and aﬀective approaches
in the EU and anti-immigration attitudes literature. Our ﬁndings show that
both explanations are signiﬁcant, but not in themselves substantive in
explaining the formation of public opinion on freedom of movement. One
explanation for the limited application of the human capital hypothesis is
data availability. Eurobarometer surveys do not collect information on vari-
ables, such as employment sector, typically emphasised in the political
economy literature (Walter 2010). Future research should aim to include a sec-
toral measure of whether the job of the respondent is likely to be substituted
by EU migrants. It should also distinguish whether the structure of these atti-
tudes diﬀers depending on EU migrants’ level of skills and country of origin.
Finally we still do not know whether and in what ways attitudes towards
intra-EU migration compare to attitudes towards a country ‘exporting’ its
own EU nationals to another EU member state
We show that support for EU freedom of movement is strongly determined
by country aﬄuence. On average, support for freedom of movement is high,
but there is a great degree of cross-national variation. Citizens in richer
countries that tend to receive more EU migrants and where the question of
EU mobility is more salient seem to be more prone to perceiving EU
freedom of movement as a threat. Crucially, we have theorised and empiri-
cally substantiated that country economic performance also yields strong
moderating eﬀects on individual-level explanations on preferences towards
freedom of movement. In poorer member states personal dispositions have
no eﬀect on attitudes towards EU freedom of movement. Support is evenly
high among diﬀerent population groups, even among those who are typically
thought to be Eurosceptic. In wealthier countries, however, attitudes are more
dependent on individual-level characteristics. In those member states, people
with strong feelings of national identity and those who are more vulnerable to
economic ﬂuctuations are signiﬁcantly more opposed to freedom of move-
ment than their peers in countries that are economically worse oﬀ. Further-
more, we have demonstrated that the structure of attitudes towards EU
freedom of movement does not fully mirror that of general attitudes
towards European integration, which do not reveal similar cross-country
patterns.
Our ﬁndings point to the importance of examining public preferences not
only on the general direction of European integration, but also explaining
public opinion on speciﬁc EU-related issues that are likely to create
diﬀerent patterns of support and opposition. Despite the fact that EU
freedom of movement primarily relates to policy-making and implementation
– in particular access to European labour markets, employment and welfare –
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it can stir up conﬂict over constitutive issues of the EU polity, including EU
membership, EU competencies, and the extent to which labour mobility
should be one of the cornerstones of European integration. It may also
place a strain on European solidarity. Our ﬁndings have signiﬁcant impli-
cations with regard to the politicisation of EU freedom of movement in
richer Western EU member states. Far right EU issue entrepreneurs in these
countries have a ready reservoir of negative opinion towards freedom of
movement to draw upon during electoral campaigns.
Notes
1. Lancee and Sarrasin (2015) question the underlying mechanism between edu-
cation and support for immigration, arguing that although there are diﬀerences
between educational groups, these disappear when examining changes within
individuals.
2. See Krings (2009) on trade unions’ diﬀerent interpretations of the impact of EU
enlargement on labour markets.
3. We discuss these two contrasting viewpoints as perceptions rather than objec-
tive measures of the eﬀect of EU freedom of movement on the labour market.
EU migrants are less likely to be registered with public employment services
and less likely to receive unemployment beneﬁts (European Commission
2014a); see Dustmann and Frattini (2014) on the ﬁscal contributions of EU
migrants in the UK; Nickell and Saleheen (2015) record a negative impact
within the semi/unskilled occupational group.
4. These concerns may not necessarily be supported by objective evidence (Giu-
letti 2014).
5. Eurobarometer datasets were retrieved from the GESIS Data Archive. https://
www.gesis.org/en/home/.
6. The question was not asked in Novembers 2015. We ran the models using three
survey waves.
7. Political economy approaches diﬀerentiate between occupational skills and
employment sector (Walter 2010), but Eurobarometer surveys do not collect
information on the latter.
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